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Executive summary
This Policy Contribution, based on a note written for the Bundestag EU Committee, 
explores the possible consequences of a no-deal Brexit for the European Union and assesses 
preparations on the EU side. It also provides guidance on the optimal strategy for the EU, 
depending on the choices made by the United Kingdom.
Overall, a no-deal Brexit would be disruptive in the short-term: 
• There would be immediate very significant administrative and logistical challenges in 
trade. Preparations to reduce those disruptions are underway but are unlikely to be suf-
ficient. But while Most-Favoured Nation tariffs will affect some sectors significantly, the 
macroeconomic effect on the German economy might not be huge.
• If the UK fails to honour its financial commitments to the EU, about €16.5 billion would 
be missing for the remainder of the current EU budgetary period. The gap could be filled 
thanks to the existing ‘own resources’ ceiling. The overall missing ‘Brexit bill’ would 
amount to about €45-50 billion.
• Not honouring financial commitments would be considered by the EU as akin to default 
and would likely lead to an uncooperative no-deal Brexit. It would be more disruptive 
than a cooperative no-deal Brexit, in which the EU and the UK cooperate on a number of 
pressing emergency files.
• The European Commission has issued a number of draft regulations to mitigate the effects 
of a no-deal Brexit, including on issues such as aviation and visas. These are comprehen-
sive but would not offset the effects of a no-deal Brexit, which would be highly disruptive 
in some sectors. 
The effects of a no-deal Brexit in the medium to long term are difficult to assess. A no-
deal Brexit would lead to deterioration in long-term political relationships, which would 
make a new trade arrangement and other cooperation in the future less likely.
A specific concern is the situation in Ireland, which is also the most contentious part 
of the Brexit negotiation. If the EU wants to protect the integrity of its single market, a no-
deal Brexit will mean the imposition of customs controls on the Irish border. The European 
Commission’s draft legislation aims to preserve the peace process, but a hard border could 
provoke renewed violence.
The overall strategic direction the EU should take would be to increase the cost to the 
UK of a no-deal Brexit as much as possible (respecting ethical limits), while showing more 
flexibility over the political declaration and possibly the withdrawal deal itself.
Policy Contribution 
Issue n˚2 | January 2019 The implications of a 
no-deal Brexit: is the 
European Union prepared?
Guntram B. Wolff
2 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚2 | January 2019
1 Introduction
The United Kingdom submitted on 29 March 2017 the notification of its intention to with-
draw from the European Union based on Article 50 of the EU Treaty. As a default, the United 
Kingdom will therefore become a third country on 30 March 2019 and cease to be a member 
of the EU. 
I see four possible scenarios:
1. The UK exits based on the negotiated withdrawal agreement. This scenario is not further 
discussed in this Policy Contribution. 
2. The UK leaves the EU without any agreement. This so-called no-deal Brexit is the core of 
this Policy Contribution (as per the Bundestag EU Committee’s request). 
3. The UK asks for an extension of the two-year Article 50 period, thus remaining a member 
of the EU until the end of the extension period. Such an extension would require the 
consent of the EU. Moreover, if the extension exceeds a few months, the UK would have to 
participate in the 2019 European Parliament elections.
4. The UK could decide to unilaterally revoke its Article 50 notification. The Court of Justice 
of the EU1 has confirmed that this can be done without requiring the consent of the EU. It 
would mean that the UK would remain a full member of the EU under the current terms.
It is impossible to say at the time of writing which of these four scenarios is the most likely. But it is important to highlight that the current UK political situation is very volatile. I 
would therefore attach a significant probability to all four scenarios.
Given that a no-deal Brexit has a significant probability, it is important to carefully 
assess the consequences of a no-deal Brexit and plan for it. This Policy Contribution 
reviews the Commission’s communication on the matter (COM(2018) 880 final; European 
Commission, 2018) and provides an assessment of the key issues of concern in case of a 
no-deal Brexit, from the point of view of the EU and Germany. The preparations are extremely 
complex, as is Brexit, which is why this Policy Contribution cannot fully review all aspects.I do not assess the problems the UK would face in case of a no-deal Brexit. However, I would like to highlight that the impact of a no-deal Brexit on the British economy will be greater in terms of percent of UK GDP than the impact of a no-deal Brexit on the EU economy in percent of EU GDP. Still, this economic judgement should not be mistaken for a political 
judgement that the UK has a greater interest in the deal that is proposed at the time of writ-
ing. The deal is multidimensional and has many repercussions in terms of sovereignty that 
British politicians might decide to reject. The economic assessment therefore is insufficient 
for making a judgement on the likelihood of the UK parliament voting for the withdrawal 
agreement.
Preparations for a no-deal Brexit should be made by the EU institutions, national 
authorities and, equally importantly, by business and citizens. There have been numer-
ous communications and warnings on being prepared for that scenario. The aim of these 
preparations should be to reduce the negative impacts of a no-deal scenario.
1 CJEU, Order of the President of the Court of 19 October 2018. Andy Wightman and Others v Secretary of State 
for Exiting the European Union. Expedited procedure. Case C-621/18. Available at http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207041&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=-
first&part=1&cid=129176.
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2 The implications of a no-deal Brexit: 
an assessment
A no-deal Brexit could take various forms. In one scenario, there will be a complete 
breakdown of all EU-UK cooperation. At some level, the EU has an interest in playing it very 
tough in a scenario in which the UK parliament decides not to ratify the agreement that was 
negotiated by its elected government with the EU. Such an act would certainly be seen as very 
unfriendly by the EU. The EU would therefore be reluctant to agree with the UK on ‘emergen-
cy’ measures. So a non-cooperative no-deal Brexit is quite possible. In another, perhaps more 
reasonable, scenario, the EU and the UK would still cooperate on some minimal issues. This is 
my baseline assumption for this section, but I stress that it would require the UK to honour its 
financial commitments to the EU.
2.1 EU budget impact
One of the politically immediately important questions will be the EU budget. If the UK 
leaves without honouring its financial commitments to the EU, the EU would politically be 
tempted to treat the UK as a defaulting counterparty. This has major political implications and 
could mean that the EU will not be ready to negotiate a meaningful relationship with the UK 
for some time.
In terms of the budget impact, the Brexit bill is estimated to be about €45-50 
billion. For the currently ongoing Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the April 2019-December 2020 gap in EU budget is estimated to be €16.5 billion in total, or 0.064 
percent of EU27 GNI under a set of assumptions2. This amount will have to be transferred by 
member states to the EU budget, while an offsetting factor is the nationally-retained 20 per-
cent of extra custom duty revenues from imports from the UK. No new legislation is needed to cover this gap, because in the current MFF’s overall own resources ceiling is 1.22 percent of GNI (ie the maximum amount of own resources which the EU may raise during a year), while 
the payment ceiling is 0.96 percent of GNI. The difference between the overall own resources 
ceiling and payment/commitment ceilings “provide room for manoeuvre in case of unfore-seen needs and emergencies”3. To our knowledge, this relatively large (about 0.26 percent of 
GNI) margin has never been used. The €16.5 billion April 2019-December 2020 gap would 
have to be distributed among the member states according to their GNIs. Germany’s con-tribution for this period could increase by about €4.2 billion, while the extra customs duty revenue would offset about €0.2 billion, making the net cost €4.1 billion (after rounding).
Given that the size of the Brexit bill is small compared to the UK budget (for example, in 
2020 it is 1 percent), but large compared to the EU budget (6.5 percent in 2020), the EU would 
justifiably consider the non-honouring of the UK’s financial commitments as a hostile act. I 
would recommend to the EU and the Bundestag to refuse making concessions on emer-
gency measures in the absence of a substantial financial contribution from the UK.
2 See Darvas (2019). The key assumptions for the projections are: no UK contribution to the EU budget starting from 
30 March 2019; no EU spending in the UK starting from 30 March 2019; the average tariff rate on imports from the 
UK will be the same as the average tariff rate on imports from non-EU countries; imports from the UK decline 
by 20 percent because of the no-deal Brexit; actual EU budget payments will be 100 percent of the MFF payment 
ceiling; other revenues will be €8.9 billion annually (average value for 2014-17). VAT and GNI-based contributions 
result as residual, using GNI shares as reflected in the European Commission’s November 2018 forecast, while the 
UK’s share of the EU28 VAT and GNI-based contribution is assumed to remain the same (11.1 percent) in 2018-
2020 as it was in 2017 (this share, which is lower than the UK’s share of GNI (14.9 percent), reflects the UK rebate, 
which varies across the years). See also Darvas et al (2017).
3 See: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/ceilings/index_en.cfm. 
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2.2 EU-UK trade relations
A no-deal Brexit has major implications for the trading relationship. Figure 1 summa-
rises the current trading relationship between the UK and Germany and the rest of the EU 
(excluding Germany)4. The EU exports a total £341 billion to the UK of which £259 billion is 
goods and £81 billion is services. The German share of that is significant: exports of £69 billion 
of goods and £9 billion of services. This trade will be affected by Brexit in any case. But in a 
no-deal scenario, there is no transition, which means that customs and regulatory controls 
will need to be applied immediately. Moreover, in a no-deal scenario, there is no agreement 
in how the trading relationship could potentially evolve – much in contrast to the deal scenar-
io, where a political declaration sets out ambitious goals for a trading relationship. The EU27 
remains the most important trading partner for the UK.
Figure 1: UK exports/imports to/from Germany and the rest of the EU (£ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on Office for National Statistics, Pink Book 2018 (2017 data).
Figure 2: UK-German trade, key sectors (€ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, ComExt statistics. Note: data is end-2015.
4 National statistics do not account for the so-called ‘Rotterdam effect’, according to which British trade with the 
Netherlands is artificially inflated by the fact that a significant proportion of trade with the continent passes 
through the port of Rotterdam (Ward, 2018). As a significant part of German exports are shipped through the 
Netherlands, the Rotterdam effect probably leads to an underestimation of Germany share of the UK’s trade with 
the EU27.
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The top five sectors exporting from Germany to the UK are road vehicles, medical and 
pharmaceutical products, petrochemicals, electrical machinery and other transport equip-
ment (Figure 2).
In a no-deal Brexit, the United Kingdom will become a third country and the appli-
cable tariffs will be WTO most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs. The UK has already notified 
the WTO that it will apply the EU’s MFN tariffs once it leaves the EU and there is no disagree-
ment on that at the WTO. Table 1 gives an overview of the tariff rates that would be applied 
to British exports, for the top five trade sectors that concern Germany. This data suggests a 
rather modest effect on overall German exports, but the effects would be relevant in 
specific sectors such as the car industry.
Table 1: Tariffs applicable to the top five trade items in case of a no-deal Brexit
Product
German exports to the UK 
in value (€ billions)
Average tariffs applied 
under WTO MFN rules
Road vehicles 28.4 10%
Medical and pharmaceutical 7.2 0%
General industrial machinery 
& equipment
4.4 1.8%
Electrical machinery 4.2 2.5%
Misc. manufactured articles 3.1 2.3%
Source: Bruegel based on WTO tariffs profile 2018 and WTO tariff data.
A no-deal Brexit would immediately create significant logistical and administrative 
challenges. Dover, one of the main points of entry into the UK for lorries, reportedly does 
not have the capacity to introduce customs controls to keep the number of lorries arriving as 
high as currently5. This will immediately affect supply chains and it will take some time until 
replacement routes are established. Similarly, EU ports do not yet have enough personnel to 
ensure adequate customs controls. The European Commission (2018) therefore reminded 
member states to stand ready to ensure controls and, in our understanding, EU member 
states have hired personnel for customs controls, veterinary checks and sanitary and phy-
tosanitary checks. Rules of origin for imports and exports from and to third countries would 
need to be applied, an administrative challenge for companies and EU and UK governments. 
Having said this, it is likely that for a period of several months, such practical questions would 
significantly affect trade relations. But it is also fair to assume that these logistical challenges 
would be resolved after some time and would not constitute a permanent barrier to trade.
There is disagreement at the WTO on the apportionment of tariff quotas included 
in the EU’s WTO schedule. The EU has negotiated tariff quotas at the WTO, which would 
need to be divided between the EU27 and the UK. In the interest of maintaining clarity and 
predictability in the multilateral trading system, the EU and the UK sent a joint letter to the 
whole WTO membership on 11 October 2017 setting out the main rationale and principles 
envisaged for this apportionment. However, the negotiations with WTO members have not 
been concluded and some members disagree with the approach. The Commission has pro-
posed a draft regulation (COM/2018/312 final) allowing it to take the necessary measures in 
relation to third countries. While such adjustment of apportions has happened before when 
Croatia joined the EU, a no-deal Brexit will raise some uncertainties. In practical terms, the 
EU and the UK would apply the new apportioned quotas once the UK leaves, but later legal 
challenges at the WTO cannot be excluded.   
5 “A live rehearsal of an emergency traffic system that will be put in place to prevent congestion in Dover in the event of 
a no-deal Brexit was described as “a waste of time” by drivers participating in the test in Kent” (7 January), accord-
ing to The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jan/07/no-deal-brexit-rehearsal-tests-traffic-
congestion-in-kent.
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The overall take away is that a no-deal Brexit would create significant short-term 
challenges for the trading relationship between the EU and the UK, which would be 
avoided with a deal. The longer-term impact depends on the political relationship and 
the terms of the future economic relationship. To assess the impact in the medium term 
would require measurement against a benchmark, such as an ambitious trading relationship 
as envisaged in the political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement. It is prob-
ably fair to assume that a no-deal Brexit would make it more difficult politically for the EU to 
engage in a trade negotiation with the UK. If the WTO’s MFN tariff rates were to be applied, 
trade in specific sectors would be affected but overall the impact might be limited in terms of 
the macroeconomy6.
2.3 Ireland 
The situation on the island of Ireland post Brexit remains one of the most difficult and 
contentious items of the Brexit negotiations. The most important point is the question of 
border controls in Ireland, which Irish observers argue could lead to new violent tensions on 
the island. Could this be prevented? The withdrawal agreement sets out a path, combined 
with a ‘backstop’, which would prevent the imposition of such a border, but is seen as strong 
interference in UK sovereignty by many in the UK House of Commons.The Commission contingency measures can only alleviate some effects of a no-deal Brexit on Ireland. The Commission issued in December 2018 a draft regulation (COM(2018) 892 
final) to ensure the continuation of the territorial cooperation programmes PEACE IV and 
United Kingdom-Ireland (Ireland-Northern Ireland-Scotland). The Commission has also sug-
gested financial support for Ireland and a number of measures to improve transport logistics 
(European Commission, 2018). But these measures can only partly mitigate the effects of a 
no-deal Brexit. In terms of immediate logistical challenges, including in the areas of energy 
and transport, it would take time to build infrastructure. But more importantly, the Good 
Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement) of 1998 was made possible by Ireland’s and the UK’s 
membership of the EU’s single market, making it possible to end all border controls.   
Paradoxically, while the main political motivation for the UK parliament to reject 
the withdrawal agreement might be the so-called backstop, a no-deal Brexit will lead 
to customs controls in Ireland that the backstop aims to prevent. Customs controls 
would be inevitable in a no-deal Brexit if the EU wants to preserve the integrity of its 
single market. In fact, once the UK is no longer in the customs union or the single market, 
customs checks will need to be enacted to preserve the integrity of the market and to apply 
EU law. The Irish government would be obliged to enforce EU law and control the borders 
and the UK government would also have an interest in enforcing its own border to ensure its 
sovereignty. The EU and the UK might therefore be ready to go back to the negotiating 
table to prevent violence on the island of Ireland in case of a likely no-deal Brexit (see 
also section 3, the conclusions).
2.4 Citizens’ rights and visa policy
British citizens as EU citizens have a fundamental right to travel to any other EU coun-
try and even the right to work. As of 30 March, this right will cease to exist and UK citizens 
will become third-country nationals. The determination as to whether a third-country nation-
al is subject to or exempt from a visa requirement is laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001. The United Kingdom government has declared its intention not to require a visa 
from citizens of the EU27 countries for short stays for purposes of tourism and business. The 
Commission proposes to amend the Council regulations to adjust the status of UK citizens 
when travelling to the EU (COM(2018) 745) final). The Commission proposed visa-free travel 
on the condition that the UK treats all EU citizens the same and grants them visa-free travel. 
I concur with the importance of requiring the UK to treat all EU citizens the same; however, 
6 For an overview of estimates of trade effects, see German Council of Economic Experts (2018).
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it is worthwhile noting that the EU has not been able to implement the same rule relative to 
the United States, which requires visas from some EU citizens but not from others. Rights of 
residence and the right of non-EU nationals to work are currently decided by EU member 
states. In our view, EU member states would be well advised to cooperate and define a unified 
position relative to the UK to help ensure a similar status for all EU citizens wanting to work 
and live in the UK. It would also be important, in our view, to distinguish between citizens 
already resident and those wanting to migrate. The status quo of residents should not be 
altered on either side in case of a no-deal Brexit. An important interest for Germany and 
the EU more generally is therefore that the accumulated rights of their citizens in the 
UK should continue to be honoured, and that the EU and the UK should agree in a no-
deal Brexit scenario to ensure cooperation in areas including social security rights and  
pension transferability.
2.5 Financial services
On financial services, we consider that the most important contingency plans have 
been made. From conversations with major financial institutions across Europe, I can con-
firm that extensive preparations have been made to deal with a no-deal Brexit. In my judge-
ment, financial instability on the EU27 side, given preparation by most market participants 
and the Commission’s recently confirmed flexibility on issues such as derivatives clearing, is 
likely to be limited. Also, British authorities have implemented measures to safeguard finan-
cial stability. This does not mean that a no-deal Brexit will be without costs. The preparations 
themselves, and the reduced liquidity, represent costs, but financial stability concerns are 
likely to be limited. It is important that the Bank of England and the European Central Bank 
continue to have a strong relationship, working together to preserve stability.
2.6 Effects on specific sectors
A no-deal Brexit could have implications for a number of specific sectors but con-
tingency planning will mitigate the immediate fall-out. For example, when it comes to 
aviation, a no-deal Brexit would mean that UK airlines can no longer operate flights in the EU, 
while safety rules would mean that flights between the EU and the UK would be affected. The 
Commission has proposed a regulation (COM(2018) 894 final) that would limit the fall-out 
from the UK’s departure from the EU aviation safety system. If the regulation is approved, 
flights between the EU and the UK will be automatically allowed for a period of another 12 
months. Nevertheless, British airlines will lose the right to operate intra-EU flights or flights to 
third countries via the EU7. 
In my assessment, the Commission has done serious work in reviewing all possible 
sectoral effects and proposing emergency draft regulations and other measures8. The 
Commission has identified that road transport, customs, sanitary requirements, personal 
data, EU climate policy, visas and citizens’ rights, and financial services might all require 
quick action.
7 There is even a debate about whether this will affect airlines such as Iberia, which is owned by Britain’s IAG. See, 
for example, https://www.ft.com/content/35ff12b0-1328-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e. 
8 See the Commission’s list of legislative initiatives and other legal acts at https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brex-
it-preparedness/legislative-initiatives-and-other-legal-acts_en.
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3 Conclusions
A no-deal Brexit would be bad news for the EU as well as for the UK in the short term, 
compared to signing the withdrawal agreement. In this Policy Contribution, I have not 
quantified how much worse a no-deal scenario would be compared to signing the current 
deal. However, I have highlighted that a no-deal would be particularly bad for Ireland, be-
cause it would lead to customs controls on the island in order to protect the integrity of the 
single market. Moreover, I have highlighted a number of immediate quite disruptive chal-
lenges for trade, for specific sectors such as airlines and pharmaceuticals, and for people. The 
withdrawal agreement is a rather complex text, documenting the extent to which economic, 
societal and political relationships are affected by Brexit. Leaving all these relationships with-
out any agreement is likely to cause significant short-term turbulence. 
The longer-term trade and more general implications are difficult to assess as they 
require making assumptions about the future EU-UK relationship. As such, that longer-
term relationship is less certain than it would be under the draft agreement with its annexed 
political declaration on the future relationship.
It is important to be prepared to reduce and mitigate the impact of a no-deal Brexit, 
also taking into account the highly uncertain political situation in the UK. The EU insti-
tutions, EU member states, business and citizens all have a role to play. But no preparation 
can satisfactorily solve the problem that Ireland would be confronted with. 
One important question for the EU is whether it would be ready to modify the terms 
of the political declaration or even the withdrawal agreement to make its ratification 
more likely. So far, the EU has stated strongly it will be impossible to alter the deal that was 
agreed between the UK government and the European Commission negotiators (Juncker, 
2018). From a strategic point of view, this is the communication that one would expect. In 
fact, one can think of the strategic situation in terms of a game-theory setting, a so-called 
chicken game. In a chicken game (Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973; Rapaport and Chammah, 
1966), two cars run at high speed towards each other. The driver who blinks first and pulls 
to the side, loses. But if neither driver blinks, the cars hit each other and both sides suffer 
damage. Game theory suggests that the driver in the weaker car would blink first because he 
would suffer the greatest damage. Yet, game theory is based on an assumption of the ration-
ality of the drivers, which might not necessarily be an accurate description of the political 
reality of Brexit. I would therefore not exclude small modifications to the political decla-
ration and possibly even the withdrawal agreement closer to the moment of a no-deal 
Brexit. The likelihood of such changes also depends on an assessment of the costs of 
no-deal Brexit on both sides.
A no-deal Brexit would require the adoption of a number of emergency laws pre-
pared by the Commission, but the key question is whether all legislation can be passed 
before 29 March. An important question is the timeframe for adoption of that legislation by 
the European co-legislators, the Council and the European Parliament. In the absence of any 
extension of the Article 50 period, the co-legislators would have to adopt the legislation before 
29 March. This could be very challenging. Moreover, adopting these regulations immediately 
could change the dynamics of the vote on the deal in the UK parliament. In my assessment, 
the EU therefore has an interest in agreeing to a short extension of Article 50 in case of no 
agreement on the withdrawal agreement. A deadline might be the last scheduled meeting of 
the European Parliament, 18 April, prior to the European elections. Technically, the longest 
possible extension seems to be until June 2019, the latest moment the European Parliament 
could still meet and legislate in its current composition. An extension beyond that period 
would lead to complicated political choices in the UK as the UK would have to participate in 
the European elections.
The EU’s readiness to cooperate on the proposed emergency measures to manage 
short-term frictions in case of a no-deal Brexit would likely depend strongly on the 
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UK’s readiness to honour its financial commitments. Some files do not require cooper-
ation under a no-deal Brexit. But it would be naïve to assume that non-cooperation would 
be cost free. Non-cooperation would significantly aggravate the costs of no-Brexit for both 
sides, but the costs would be particularly high in the UK. I have argued that the EU is right 
to take a strong stance on money. Under a more reasonable scenario, I would expect 
cooperation on a number of key files such as visa rights, frictions on the Irish border 
and customs cooperation. Member states, parliamentarians and EU institutions should be 
ready for no-deal emergency agreements, especially when it comes to areas in which human 
lives might be at stake, such as health cooperation or nuclear cooperation. Also in financial 
services, cooperation is highly advisable as a no-cooperation no-deal Brexit could increase 
financial stability risks. No matter what the UK’s position is, the EU should aim to prevent the 
worst outcomes when it comes to human lives and financial stability.
The overall strategic direction I would advise the EU to take is to increase the cost 
of a no-deal Brexit as much as possible (while respecting ethical limits), while showing 
more flexibility on the political declaration and possibly the withdrawal deal itself. The 
EU and the UK have a long-term interest in being close partners. Departure of the UK without 
any deal would be a very bad signal to the world about the ability of the UK in particular and 
also of the EU to cooperate with strategic partners. It would be highly damaging in terms of 
the UK-EU (political) relationship. Highlighting this political cost of a no-deal Brexit should 
help convince the UK parliament to sign a deal. Nevertheless, all players should quietly make 
preparations at a technical level to prepare for no-deal.
The next six months could very well prove politically turbulent, with significant 
brinkmanship. It is of the upmost importance that the EU remains united. It is also 
important that the EU does not lose sight of its long-term strategic interests. 
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